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In February, 1986, large sections of northern California
experienced a period of intense and protracted rain and snow
storms from a series of back to back wet Pacific storms. As a
consequence, maj or flooding occured in a number of areas along
several river drainage systems. The flooding and associated
damages resulted in large scale property damage to residences,
businesses and agricultural enterprises, including key
viticultural areas of Sonoma and Napa counties. In the course of
the flooding, thousands of families were evacuated, homes
destroyed and daily life disrupted. A number of California
counties received federal disaster declarations, making them
eligible for federal relief programs made available through
Disaster Assistance Centers (DAC I s) established throughout the
stricken areas by FEMA.
While national media attention to the unprecedented flooding
in northern California was quickly redirected to the destruction
of one of NASA's space shuttles, the problems of responding to
the flood and its thousands of victims nevertheless persisted.
The paucity of national media coverage of the events in
California belies the scope and impact of the disaster in terms
of both financial and human costs. While the death toll was very
low, the property damage and resultant dislocation of families
was extensive if not adequately dramatic to draw media attention
away from the space shuttle debacle.
The destruction of homes and the displacement of families
made the stricken communities a suitable place to investigate the
role of social support in mitigating the stressful effects of
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residential dislocation on disaster victims. Prior to the
Cal ifornia disasters, approval to study social support and the
mental health impacts of disasters had been received from the
Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,
under the aegis of it's "Quick Response" research program. This
report presents findings from research conducted with NHRAIC
support.
To present an overview of the research that I conducted, this
report will be divided into three major sections. First a
general description of the flooding and its social impacts in
northern California will be presented. Because the nature of the
flooding differed considerably by locale, these differences will
be highlighted. This particular study will focus on one impacted
community, and the nature of the disaster in that community will
be described after an overview of the statewide damage is
presented.
The second segment of this report will describe the study
questions that guided the research and briefly discuss some of
the extant literature on the topic. In this section the field
procedures that were followed as well as a description of the
qualitative methodologies will be given. Because of several
unique characteristics of the research setting, data gathering
techniques required a certain amount of flexibility, hence the
use of qualitative techniques.
The third segment of this report will examine the data,
looking specifically at social support and mental health impacts
of the disaster, relocation stressors, housing problems, pre-
disaster social trends and post-disaster effects. Included here
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will be a discussions of some of the unique problems that seemed
to affect the victims (and disaster workers) in the flooded
community.
The Winter Floods, California 1986
Northern California was battered by series of intense
Pacific storms starting February 12, 1986 and persisting for more
than a week. While some 29 counties in California were declared
emergency areas by the state, the locales receiving the greatest
damage included Sonoma, Napa, Lake, and Yuba Counties, along with
large areas of the delta region where the Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers empty into San Francisco Bay.
The chief source of flooding in Sonoma County was the
Russian River which heavily damaged the town of Guerneville, the
sUbject of this study. To the east in Napa County, the Napa
River flooded causing the evacuation of 4200 residents of the
town of Napa. Property damages estimates in Napa were placed at
forty million dollars with an additional sixteen million dollars
in damage to the vineyards. Some 12,000 of 30,000 acres of wine
grapes were inundated although growers did not expect any long
term effects on production.
Another major source of property damage was the Yuba river
which broke through an 84 foot high levee and flooded the town of
Linda near Sacramento. Ironically, the Yuba was over 5 feet
below flood stage when the break occured. Some 26,000 residents
were forced to evacuate and the flooding resulted in 6,700 homes
being inundated at an estimated property loss of $50 million.
Elsewhere, 1300 had to evacuate after a levee break along the
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Mokelumne River.
Because much of the delta region is up to 20 feet below sea
level, the levee. system containing the rivers flowing into the
area is critical, with breaks resulting in large scale flooding.
Levee breaks along the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers
resulted in over 10,000 acres of prime farmland being flooded.
Because of the volume of rain received (some towns reporting 22
inches in one week), rivers such as the Sacramento carried record
flows, often more than the 1100 miles of levees in the area could
contain. For example the normal winter flow of the Sacramento is
approximately 40,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) but during the
February floods it reached over 630,000 cfs. Elsewhere, flooding
along the Eel River resulted in the destruction of two hundred
redwoods up to 1000 years old, a loss of an essentially
irreplaceable scenic resource.
In addition to riverine flooding and levee breaks, lake
flooding also caused evacuation of residents. Clear Lake rose 4
feet over its banks necessitating the evacuation of 450 families
living along its shores. Due to constricted outflow from the
lake, once the rains ceased the lake could be lowered less than
two inches per day. Lake Sonoma, a recently constructed flood
control and recreational lake went from 120 thousand acre feet to
240 thousand acre feet as it impounded some of the record runoff.
The lake is credited wi~h preventing the Russian River from
cresting any higher than it did. A considerable area of the
Russian's watershed lies below the dam, hence the extensive
flooding that did occur.
Some of the worst flooding along the Russian River occured
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where the river cuts a steep canyon through the rugged Coast
Range to the point where it empties into the Pacific at the town
of Jenner. Perhaps hardest hit was the town of Guerneville,
located along the Russian at the junction of two converging side
canyons. More than 1600 had to be evacuated from the Russian
River area (including but not limited to Guerneville) with some
1000 homes receiving flood damage. In Guerneville, about 150
housing units were declared uninhabitable as a result of flood
damage. At the start of the storms (Feb 12, 1986) the Russian
Riv~r was running at 8.5 feet. It crested at more than 49 feet,
17 feet above flood stage. The flooding was such that
Guerneville, at one point was isolated and victims had to be
evacuated to Santa Rosa by helicopter. utility service in
Guerneville was disrupted for more than two weeks, denying
victims the water necessary to clean up their previously
inundated homes. Overall, damages in Sonoma County were
estimated at 25 million dollars and the county received a federal
disaster declaration.
Overall losses in California have been placed at $319
million. The state drafted a $115 million state emergency aid
plan for victims including a program of $5000 cash grants for
victims without insurance. Those monies were in addition to
FEMA's aid programs, meaning victims could receive as much as $10
thousand in cash grants. The Red Cross provided important
emergency aid as well as temporary housing support for victims of
the Guerneville flood, as well as in other stricken areas.
Because of the nature of the damage in Guerneville and the
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evacuation experiences of victims, it was selected as the
research site. Guerneville and several adjoining small
communities including Monte Rio, are focused 'on summer
tourist/vacation trade. However, the area also is home to a
number of poorer residents. The Russian River and its
tributaries have flooded the town in the past, but to nowhere
near the extent of the 1986 deluge.
Because of Guerneville's geographic (and some would say
social and economic) isolation from the rest of Sonoma County,
the management of the flooding and evacuation was somewhat
problematic. The county's emergency services disaster center in
Santa Rosa was mobilized on Feb. 13 (Thursday) and the Red Cross
soon after. The mobilization was in response to county wide
heavy rains which had pushed the Russian River up to 32 feet,
five short of flood stage. A 37 foot crest was predicted for
Saturday the 15th. The Red Cross established an emergency shelter
in the Guerneville Veterans Memorial Building which housed 160
evacuees that Saturday when the river crested at 38.4 feet.
On Sunday the National Weather Service issued a statement
saying that the river at Hopland had peaked and was receding,
indicating that it would soon be dropping in downstream
Guerneville. However because of heavy rains in the central
watershed, downstream of the Hopland gauging station, the river
did not act according to official expectations. The Russian
began further rising on that Sunday and on Monday (Feb. 17) a
local state of emergency was declared. The river hit 46 feet
late monday and surged toward its eventual near 49 foot crest on
Tuesday. While many residents had already evacuated their homes
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for the apparent safety of the emergency shelter in the Veteran's
Building, their evacuation experiences were, in fact, just
beginning.
Late Monday, as the river continued to rise, officials
decided to evacuate the emergency shelter and take the refugees
to Santa Rosa 25 miles to the east of the stricken community.
However by the time that decision was made both roads to Santa
Rosa were closed from flooding, leaving no overland escape route.
Instead, the victims were first moved to a church on high ground
in Guerneville to await a helicopter evacuation to shelter
facilities in Santa Rosa. Through apparent problems in
coordination between various organizations managing the
emergency, there were delays in the airlift. Not all of the 1200
refugees were able to be evacuated that Tuesday and thus had to
remain in Guerneville while the flooding continued. The
remaining victims were evacuated by noon the following day. It
took a total of 152 helicopter "sorties" to evacuate all the
victims to emergency shelter in Santa Rosa.
Because of the scale of the flooding, the numbers affected,
and the failure of the river to "behave" consistently with
expectations, agencies were caught somewhat unprepared. Because
far more were displaced than expected, food and manpower were in
short supply in the emergency shelter as the flooding started.
While the Red Cross had expected to use a Guerneville grocery
store as a food supplier for the shelter, the store was soon
flooded depriving them of a local supplier. The Red Cross was
already responding to county wide flooding as well, resulting in
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personnel and materiel shortages to manage the Guerneville
disaster. Because of Guerneville's relative isolation and the
number of agencies involved in the emergency, communication
.
problems reportedly made coordination of response activities
difficult. In the course of data gathering, victims were not
short of criticism for how the evacuation was managed and when it
was begun. Interviews with Red Cross workers disclosed that
throughout the evacuation process, as well as in the emergency
shel ters, they were targets of " •.. surprising amounts of
hostility by victims."
Victi~s evacuated to Santa Rosa were able to find emergency
shelter at facilities set up by the Red Cross. A total of more
than 700 evacuees occupied the Santa Rosa shelter on Feb. 18.
The shelter was kept open for two weeks to allow refugees to find
new housing or to return to their old homes in Guerneville •. At
the time of closing of the shelter (March 4) approximately sixty
victims were still housed there. Remaining victims were placed
in motels by the Red Cross while they looked for housing.
However according to Red Cross officials, approximately 30% of
those in the shelter at its closing may very well have been
homeless but not as a result of the flood. One of the problems
that was repeatedly mentioned by officials in the course of my
research was the incidence of fraudulent disaster victims:
persons seeking aid and housing from disaster agencies who, in
fact were not disaster victims.
As victims returned to Guerneville, they then began the task
of cleaning up (for those whose houses remained) and applying for
aid from Red cross, FEMA and as soc ia ted agenc ies and
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organizations. One of the chief problems facing the homeless
was finding affordable housing in a county with very expensive
housing. Guerneville represented one of the few locations where
low cost housing was available in Sonoma County, but the Russian
River managed to erase much of that housing stock. That left low
income victims with a significant problem in trying to locate
aff'ordable housing in the Guerneville area. Problems victims
faced in emergency shelter, in obtaining aid, and in finding
housing will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
Study Methods
Based on the nature of events at Guerneville, I selected that
town to study the short-term mental heal th impacts of the
disaster and what role social support may have played in
affecting those impacts. Because of the problems already alluded
to in terms of repeated evacuations, emergency shelter
experiences and housing shortages, many victims experienced a
numbe~ of stressful events. The central question that I studied
was: What is the relationship between the use of social support
networks and the psychosocial or mental health status of victims
who had to live in emergency or temporary shelter as a result of
the disaster in Guerneville? Basically this brief study involves
a qualitative examination of several issues: the mental health
impact of disaster (short-term); relocation stressors and related
response generated demands; the use of informal helping networks
by victims to cope with disaster related stresses.
At the outset the reader is advised that this study is based
on a small scale "survey" of 15 victims who were interviewed
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informally with a simple interview protocol. It does not purport
to be either a clinical assessment of the mental status of
disaster victims, nor does it claim to be a· systematic,
quantified sample of all victims using predetermined interview
schedules to provide quantified measures of selected scales. In
that sense, this study is exploratory, based on several sources
of data.
The study of the mental health impacts of disaster is a
burgeoning area within the overall field of disaster studies.
without delving into an overall review of that literature (see
Sowder, 1985 for a recent review), some of the literature that
pertains to this study will be noted.
There is disagreement in the literature as to the occurence,
pervasiveness and persistence of mental health disturbances as a
result of disaster (e.g. Perry and Lindell, 1978; Quarantelli,
1979 and 1985). However there is ample evidence that under
certain conditions, psychosocial problems do occur (e.g. Hocking,
1970; Lifton, 1967; Lindy et al., 1981; Gleser et a1., 1981;
Sowder, 1985).
Quarantelli (1979) has argued that some of the stresses that
disaster victims face are not the result of the disaster per se
but rather the result of the societal responses to the event.
These "response generated demands" can include forced evacuation,
stays in emergency and temporary shelter, permanent relocation,
condemnation of properties, and disaster agency bureaucratic
"hassles."
In the case of living in emergency or temporary shelter,
as well as long-term relocation, victims often experience a
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number of stresses associated with the loss of home and
neighborhood and the disruption of support networks (Sowder and
Steing1ass, 1985; Garrison, 1985). Additionally, the failure to
find suitable or stable housing arrangements can inhibit various
aspects of victim recovery (Bolin and Bolton, Forthcoming).
Frequent residential changes while in temporary shelter has been
found to have negative psychosocial impacts (e.g. Gleser, et
a1.,1981; Lindy and Grace, 1985).
As Solomon (1985) has noted, disasters disrupt ongoing kin
and friendship based social networks as well as create the need
for support from those networks. Kin and friends can offer
victims emotional support, instrumental help in
cleanup/rebuilding, temporary shelter, transportation, and the
like (Cobb, 1976; Kahn and Antonucci, 1980).
While coping with crises within the family is the normative
strategy in this culture, failure to deal effectively with a
crisis internally may result in families turning to support
networks for assistance. Such support networks may be either kin
based or non-kin support groups (Solomon,1985). The close,
intimate and personalized assistance available from primary group
members may be effective in mitigating the effects of stress on
persons in crisis situations such as natural disasters.
Paradoxically, disasters and the social responses to them
may disrupt support networks while, as noted previously,
creating a "need" for such support. Whenever victims are
residentially displaced, from evacuation to emergency or
temporary shelter, or through permanent relocation, their access
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to support networks may be hampered. In cases of evacuation, of
course, evacuees exhibit a preference for going to the homes of
friends or kin over that of official shelters (Drabek and Key,
1984). Evacuation to the homes of friends and kin places victims
in a socially supportive context (e.g. Loizos, 1977),
particularly in societies in which responsibility to kin
outweighs problems such as overcrowding and monetary demands
(Bolton, 1979).
In situations in which victims temporarily or permanently
relocate, their access to the stress bUffering effects of support
networks may be disrupted, hindering their psychosocial recovery
from the disaster (Bolin, 1983; Parker, 1977). Relocation can
deny victims access to the therapeutic effects of social support
in the post-disaster community (Milne, 1977; Wettenha11, 1979).
The disruptions of visitation patterns, familiar surroundings,
and a secure home that accompany relocation increase the stress
levels that victims experience (Ahearn and Castellon, 1979;
Dudasik, 1980). The likelihood of mental health problems among
victims has been found to increase qS a result of such
"relocation stressors ll (Parker, 1977:589).
Field Procedures: In order to study the relationship
between the use of social support and the emotional status of
victims, I utilized two sources of information- victim interviews
and interviews with officials from a number of agencies and
organizations that had knowledge of the mental health impacts of
the disaster on victims in the Guerneville area. After
preliminary phone contacts with FEMA in California and the
California Office of Emergency Services to gather general
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background information, I began field work in March 1986,
approximately one month after the flooding ended in Guerneville.
In order to determine the most effective way to identify and
contact a small number of victims in Guerneville for
interviewing, I first interviewed representatives from several
organizations. These included Red Cross District operations in
Santa Rosa, People for Economic Opportunity in Santa Rosa
(involved in helping the poor and homeless in Sonoma County), Red
Cross Service Center caseworkers in Guerneville, and mental
health workers from the Guerneville outreach program.
Information obtained in these interviews helped in finalizing the
general interview protocol to be followed in the interviewing of
victims. It also alerted me to particular idiosyncracies of the
setting as well as problems I might anticipate in the
interviewing. Included in the latter was a warning that I could
encounter high levels of xenophobia in some members of the
community and the suggestion that I not attempt interviews with
outlying victims without being accompanied by a community member.
Apparently in the more remote mountainous regions around
Guerneville, some residents are engaged in the farming of an
illegal cash crop that is of no small interest to the DEA and
other law enformcement agencies, hence the warning. The counter-
cultural element coupled with a considerable amount of anger and
frustration with disaster agency representatives also made a
stranger asking questions suspect in the eyes of some victims.
In the course of my interviews with agency and program
personnel I was fortunate enough to make contact with a long-time
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resident of Guerneville who offered his assistance in identifying
and interviewing victims in the area. In addition, because he
was present during all phases of the flooding from onset through
the serial evacuations of townspeople to their piecemeal return
he functioned as something of a local informant (in the
anthropological sense of the word). Because I alone would be
doing the interviewing, and would be limited in the number of
victims I could interview, he helped me identify 15 actual flood
victim, based on his personal knowledge of the victims. Because
he functioned as a Red Cross volunteer in the emergency centers,
he had first-hand knowledge of many of the victims. One of the
problems in the Guerneville area, as detailed to me by several
Red Cross personnel was that some of the victims making claims
for flood aid were not, in fact, flood victims. :Before
interviewing victims, their "authenticity" as flood victims was
verified through
zone.
pre-flood addresses that were in the impact
Data Gathering: Because of the small scale nature of this
study and some of the special characteristics of the study site
already alluded to, all interviews were conducted using a general
protocol of topics to be discussed. Interviews with agency
personnel were focused on the activities of the organizations in
the emergency and special problems they encountered in managing
the Guerneville operation. Case workers for Sonoma County
outreach and for the local Red Cross in Guerneville were asked
detailed questions about the victims in terms of their housing
options, their psycho-social status, and their long-term options
for being able to resettle in Guerneville.
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Information from
these interviews was recorded and compiled for presentation in
this report.
For interviews with victims a two page protocol of general
questions was prepared to guide interviews. Victims were first
queried about their pre-flood housing and occupation. Questions
were then asked about their flood experience, including
evacuation, time spent in emergency and temporary shelter, as
well as their use of informal support networks during the
emergency period for shelter, transportation and related aid.
victims were asked to assess their post flood experiences and
prospects in terms of reestablishing housing as well as
particular problems they might be having in getting aid and
housing.
Lastly victims were asked a general set of questions
regarding their emotional status as a result of the disaster and
the role of support from kin and friends in affecting their
emotional status. Because of the small sample, the use of
quantifiable formal mental health inventories was rej ected as
inappropriate. Rather included in the protocol were general
questions based on symptoms and feelings they may have
experienced (depression, feelings of helplessness, hostility,
compulsive behavior, anxieties, fears etc. (e.g. Dohrenwend et
al.,1980; Derogatis, 1975). It must be emphasized that although
the questions were br9adly based on psychological scales, the
informal nature of the interviewing did not provide quantifiable
measures. Instead the interviews provided indications of general
psychological distresses, not clearly defined DSM III diagnostic
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categories of mental disorders. All responses to questions were
recorded and later compiled and sorted into general themes and
categories of responses~ This sorting and summarization of
answers constitutes the data analysis for this paper.
Qualitatitive techniques such as these are well suited to
exploratory research. Such techniques also allow flexibility in
dealing with disaster victims who, for one reason or another,
might be sensitive to a more formal interview style. In the case
of Guerneville victims the informality of the interviews
allowed completion of interviews with some victims who quite
clearly would have rejected a formal interview. Interviews
ranged in length from 30 minutes to one hour depending on the
nature of the victim's post-disaster experiences and the types of
problems they might have experienced. Interviews were completed
over a four day period in the Guerneville area, except for one
interview done in Santa Rosa with a victim who hadn't yet been
able to find housing in Guerneville.
Analysis
victims that were interviewed can be divided into two broad
socio-economic categories. One group consisted of lower-middle
to upper-middle conventionally employed persons. conventional
here refers to small property owners (resorts, restaurants etc.)
or wage workers at various enterprises or organizations
(mechanic, firefighter etc.) in Guerneville. Incomes among this
group ranged from $18,000 to more than $40,000 yearly. A chief
characteristic of this category of victims (n=9) was relative
residential stablility in the area, and the existence of friend
and kin networks in the Santa Rosa area (as well as Guerneville).
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The second category of victims that were interviewed can be
characterized as poor, residentially mobile and lacking in
elaborate friendship or kin networks outside the impacted
community. Three of the victims interviewed were female heads of
households on AFDC with incomes below the poverty line. Three
others were self-employed artisans with marginal incomes. All
victims in this second category lived in rental units or
trailers, in contrast to the first group which tended to own
their homes. It is in this latter group where the highest levels
of depression, anxiety and feelings of helplessness about the
future, were mentioned during my interviews.
From interviews with the victims, it became possible to
identify several distinct sources of stress that they
experienced. The intial flooding of homes and property began the
sequence of stressors for all victims. Evacuation to emergency
shelter and the serial evacuation of two evacuation centers,
cUlminating in the aerial evacuation of refugees to Santa Rosa
was a second source of stress. For victims without alternative
housing, the stay in the emergency shelter in Santa Rosa
also constituted a protracted stressor. The return to Guerneville,
the clean-up of damaged homes, the search for new housing, and
the seeking of recovery aid were all tasks facing victims at the
time that interviewing took place.
Of course, not all these stressors impacted victims to the
same extent. Among the "conventional" victims, for example, none
stayed in the emergency shelter in Santa Rosa, but rather found
shelter in the homes of kin or in motels. Poorer victims did
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not appear to have networks to draw on in Santa Rosa for
emergency or temporary shelter, and thus stayed in the emergency
shelter, an experience not without its own challenges and
demands.
For the victims living in rental housing, a· combination of
factors conspired to produce heightened stress levels resulting
in more self-reports of depression, sleeplessness, and anxiety of
the future. As already noted, this category of victims did not
have a support network to draw on outside the damaged community.
Similarly, the friends (none had kin) they reported in
Guerneville tended to have few resources with which to help out.
Indeed, many of their friends had also been "wiped out" by the
flood. This is in contrast with the other category of
respondents, who, for the most part received temporary shelter
from kin or friends, and who were also able to recruit friends
from non-impacted areas to help out in the drudgery of clean up
from the flood. Not surprisingly, the reported levels of
depression and anxiety in this group appeared consistently lower
than in the lower SES group.
One caveat is in order however in drawing conclusions about
the mental health impacts of the disaster and its aftermath on
the victims in this study. That is, there is no way to determine
to what extent any of the indication~ of depression or anxiety
were present prior to the disaster. Most reviews of the mental
health literature indicate a higher incidence of mental health
problems among those in the lower reaches of the class hierarchy
in the U.S.
However it is also clear that the lack of support networks
18
for the poorer victims who were interviewed meant that they
experienced stresses that other victims did not, while at the
same time having fewer monetary or social resources to draw on to
help them cope. Post-disaster housing is emblematic of some of
the difficulties this group of victims faced.
Guerneville, according to interviews with agency personnel,
is literally the only site of "low income" housing in Sonoma
County, and there was little of that available even before the
flood. This fact accounts for the presence of a considerable
number of AFDC families, low income artisans and the like in
Guerneville, as it was the only source of low income housing in
the county. However the disaster destroyed many of the rental
housing units that the poor lived in, exacerbating a shortage of
low rent housing. Thus for many of the poor in Guerneville,'
their prospects for finding post-flood housing were very limited.
This is in addition to the fact that federal programs to help
disaster victims recover are much more generous for homeowners
than for renters. In essence renters were left to fend for
themselves after their 60 days (double the normal time) of rental
assistance ran out.
Because of the difficulty in finding replacement housing for
the poorer victims, many returned to live in flood damaged
housing rather than have their landlords repair the building. In
addition, as some rental properties were repaired, rents were
raised, to the point where several victims accused their
landlords of price gouging. In one instance, a landlord was
insisting that his tenants bUy new refrigerators for their
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apartments, to replace those destroyed in the flood. Since most
could barely afford the rent, his insistence on the purchase of
refrigerators meant that many could no longer live there. The
problems that poorer victims faced with housing resulted in
apparent grief-like reactions over a lost home and fears of not
being able to find suitable (and affordable) housing.
One of the victims interviewed alluded to a " ••• real feeling
of desperation about this [her destroyed trailer]. I guess lIm
just stuck•.. sometimes I just sit here and start crying. II This
attitude was not uncommon among the poorer victims interviewed.
Most indicated that the feeling of being homeless and not having
any good prospects for reestablishing one, was stressful and
inescapable.
victims who had owned their own homes prior to the flood
appeared to have access to more resources as well as to support
networks to aid in clean-up and rebuilding. Although many in
this group reported frustrations and fatigue with the process of
clean-up, aid applications and so forth, most also indicated some
optimism about getting resettled. Because this group as a whole
utilized kin and friends as sources of emergency shelter as well
as in helping them in moving back into their former homes, none
expressed any of the sense of helplessness and depression that
some of the poorer victims did. They were likely to mention, in
the course of the interviews, how grateful they were for the help
their friends and kin provided in the aftermath. While this
social support cannot be considered the only mitigating factor in
the apparent lower levels of psychosocial distress among the
higher SES group, virtually all mentioned it during interviews.
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Because of some of the expressions of depression, grief and
anxiety that were being mentioned by some of the poorer victims,
I interviewed the case workers both at the Red Cross service
center and at the outreach program at Guerneville to get a
broader perspective on some of the types of psychosocial problems
they had encountered during the emergency and in the time period
since.
In addition to an increased overall caseload since the
flood, I was told at the outreach Center that they were treating
an increase in depression cases. Caseworkers there reported that
for a period of a few days after the flood there was a period of
"elation" but after a week people "started wearing down and
breaking down." For those with homes, the return to Guerneville
meant a breakdown in social support and an increase in
psychological stress, according to one social worker. Also it
was reported that there were some poorer victims whose "basic
living needs weren't being met." The reference here was to
homeless victims who had neither the resources nor the access to
resources from support networks to get resettled into permanent
housing.
While social workers at the outreach program agreed that it
was poor victims, those "at the margins of society," that were
having the greatest difficulty in coping, a common source of
grief and bereavement among several victims in counseling there
was the loss of pets. In my interviews, 4 victims also expressed
guilt over the loss of pets and indicated that it was that loss
that was the hardest to accept.
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To summarize the main points thus far, victims interviewed
who indicated the highest level of psychosocial distress
(paticularly depressive states) tended to be poorer, have fewer
friends whom to draw on for support, had problems in finding
affordable housing to return to, and as a consequence had the
longest stays in the emergency shelter in Santa Rosa. While
higher SES victims were more likely to have friends and kin in
Santa Rosa (4 of the 9 responden~s worked there), the opposite
held for the poorer victims. Among the latter, virtually none
reported friends outside the immediate Guerneville area. Thus
for most of the higher SES victims, the evacuation from
Guerneville meant continued access to social support networks, if
desired. For the poorer respondents, the evacuation meant being
removed from available support except for whatever friends also
staying in the emergency shelter.
Based on information provided by Red Cross workers, outreach
workers, as well as interviews with victims, staying in shelters
was a source of considerable strain for many including those
.
responsible for managing the shelters. Based on these sources,
it would be safe to characterize the shelters as having
unprecedented levels of violence, interpersonal aggression and
hostility compared to most reports of shelter behavior in the
literature.
One respondent told me during an interview, "I was stuck in
three different shelters. I was hungry, I got wet and cold and
spent alot of time not knowing what was going on. Some people
around me were drunk or stoned and frankly I was pretty damned
scared of them. At times I thought the flood was the least of my
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problems."
These problems were confirmed in discussions with Red Cross
workers. One shelter worker described some of the victims as
" ... street people, a real sad group. They were using drugs,
alcohol, selling drugs ••. there was an attempted rape and family
disputes." To try to alleviate such problems, armed guards were
posted at. facilities to try to control some of the aggressive
behavior. Guerneville outreach also placed social workers in the
shelters to help victims talk out their hostilities and to keep
violent behavior in check. Red Cross workers implied that it was
the so-called "street people" who were the source of much of the
anti-social behavior in the shelters. One respondent indicated
that when shelter workers gave priority to the elderly for food
and water, they received verbal abuse from other shelter
occupants.
Whatever the source of the troubles in the shelters, those
who spent any time in the shelters found the experience
stressful. Because shelter workers were the targets of much
hostility, I pursued this sUbject in interviews with Red Cross
workers who managed the shelters and the disbursement of aid.
The central problems from shelter worker points of view
centered on the "unconventional" nature of some of the victims
and the problem of fraudulent claims for disaster aid. Because
many of the victims lived in campers, buses and the like,
verification of addresses was difficult for shelter workers.
Similarly, a number of those utilizing Red Cross aid and shelter
apparently had no clear "family structure" in the conventional
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sense. This made it difficult to identify heads of households or
the number of persons in a household who actually qualified for
aid. This, in turn, created problems in the disbursement of aid.
The lack of verifiable addresses also made determining whether an
aid applicant was actually a flood victim problematic. This
resulted in very lengthy interviews with victims as they applied
for aid. These delays resulted in heightened levels of hostility
toward agency personnel by victims. As one shelter worker said
in an interv iew, "These people would come in here with a
different story each time trying to get aid. Alot of us weren't
trained to deal with this. It's real hard to approach victims
.'
while doubting there eligibility. And it got even worse when the
shelter was moved to Santa Rosa. There we got more homeless
coming in trying to be flood victims. They just overloaded the
facilities." The upshot was that fraudulent claims and the
demand for immediate relief by some victims placed many shelter
workers in a very demanding and stressful situation. The problem
of worker burnout was frequently mentioned by those agency
personnel that were interviewed.
One experienced disaster worker indicated that the
Guerneville operation presented " .•• far more problems than
normal." One specifically mentioned problem was the fact that as
the Santa Rosa shelter operation wound down, the Red Cross was
left with a small group of "hard core homeless." This refered to
a small group of apparent victims who had no housing and were not
trying to find any. One official indicated that when the shelter
would be closed, most in this group would " ... just drift off."
Verifiable victims who rented were entitled to sixty days rent
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while they looked for new housing. The Red Cross was covering
rents (typically in motels) until victim's federal aid checks
arrived. Such delays, as well as protracted stays in motels were
additional factors mentioned by victims as continuing problems
that they were facing.
The flooding in Guerneville seemed to exacerbate pre-
existing problems in the community. As already noted, the lack
of low income housing became even greater after the flood. The
marginal economic existence of a segment of the community became
more marginal. Virtually all of the poorer victims that I
interviewed indicated that they did not feel that they had many
good prospects for finding suitable new housing. As one told me,
"The folks I know around here are in the same fix I am. Some of
them have been evicted and [their landlord] has kept their damage
deposits. It's not like I can ask them for help."
For those respondents who were homeowners, their post-flood
experiences and prospects appeared markedly different from the
poorer victims. As a group they expressed fewer worries about
the future, and made fewer statements about being depressed,
anxious, or angry about the aid situation. similarly, they
expressed fewer somatic complaints such as fatigue and
sleeplessness. Because the homeowners tended not to reside in
emergency shelters in the few weeks after the flood and had
liveable options in terms of temporary housing, it is not
surprising that they had fewer stress related complaints than did
the victims who were renters.
For the low income victims, on the other hand, the lack of
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support networks in conjunction with longer stays in the public
shel ter and few opportunities for reestablishing permanent
housing in Guerneville appear associated with several
negative mental health complaints. This latter group of victims
were more likely to answer positively to questions about if they
were: nervous or jumpy, anxious, worried, or had trouble
relaxing. They also frequently referred to themselves (in
response to questions) as being depressed, in low spirits, or
"felt like crying." In terms of positive affect for others, they
were more likely to refer to themselves as feeling lonely or all
alone. In terms of quantitative measures of psychological
distress then, such answers would be categorized as expressions
of (respec:tively) anxiety, depression and weak emotional ties
(e.g.Veit and Ware, 1983). While my sample is too small to
quantify meaningfully, it was apparent in the course of
interviewing, that the higher SES, homeowning victims were not
troubled by such distressed states nearly as frequently or as
deeply as the poorer victims. As one victim noted in an
interview, " ... well, you know for about a week afterward I was
really tied up and nervous, but once I got back here and got busy
with clean-up things don't seem too bad. I think things will
work out pretty well ... "
Given the existential probl~ms facing the poorer Guerneville
victims, it should not be surprising that they appeared to' have
higher levels of psychological distress than other victims. From
the small sample of victims I interviewed, it can't be determined
if the lack of social support played a significant role in that
distress. The lack of social support was one factor that
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conspired with several others (e. g. longer stays in emergency
shelters, housing problems, few personal resources) to add to the
stressfulness of their post-disaster situation. From the other
group of victims it can be concluded that having family or
friends in surrounding communities became an important way to
avoid a protracted stay in the emergency shelter, with whatever
psychological benefits that may have entailed. Too, having
surplus income or other financial resources allowed higher SES
victims to evacuate to motels, without needing to wait for cash
grants from the Red Cross or FEMA.
Conclusions
The flooding in Guerneville impacted what, in many ways is a
unique population,. and as a result, a number of problems emerged
both for victims and for the agencies responding ~o the flood, as
have been documented here. As such, the Guerneville flood
confronted agencies used to responding in relatively routinized
ways to victim needs, with many "non-routine victims" and
extraordinary problems. Such problems as: violence and drugs in
emergency shelters, non-familial collective living arrangements
with several adults in the household claiming aid, fraudulent
claims for aid by non-victims, difficulties in verifying
addresses because victims lived in buses or tents, hostility by
some victims toward aid givers, protracted evacuation
experiences, extensive exposure to the flood for some victims,
intensification of low income housing shortages due to flood
damage, were present and affected agency personnel, victims or
both.
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Identifiable psychological distresses, including depression,
anxiety, post-flood sleep disturbances were found to be more
common among lower income victims, victims who, for the most part
lacked extensive social support networks outside the stricken
community. Such victims tended to lack steady employment or
income (several were on AFDC) and had difficulties in dealing
with the various aid bureaucracies because of unconventional
living arrangements and the lack of easily verifiable addresses.
One Red Cross worker referred to such victims as "ghettoized,
people stuck in a different kind of poverty •.. drugs etc." While
this "category" of victim only constituted a small portion of the
Guerneville victims, in the eyes of various agency personnel
responding to the emergency, they created major demands for the
aid giving agencies.
From interviews with both middle and lower SES victims, it
was the lower SES victims who were most likely to express various
indicators of psychological distress, as noted above. Middle
class victims tended to have the material, social support, and
psychological resources to better cope with the many stresses
associated with some of the unique characteristics of the
Guerneville flood. Because middle income victims tended to be
homeowners they had access to more extensive aid programs from
the federal government (e.g. SBA loans, longer periods of rent
subsidy while homes were being rebuilt or cleaned up etc.),
reducing some of the demands and stresses being placed on them as
recovery proceeded. One important way that the middle income
victims tended to differ from the lower income victims in my
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sample was the fact that the former averaged less than three days
stay in emergency shelters, while at least one of the poorer
victims I interviewed was still homeless and in the emergency
shelter more than three weeks after the flood. victims with the
most extensive stays in emergency shelter (10 days or more)
appeared to express more feelings of depression than others. In
this regard then, being able to draw on informal social support
networks was instrumental for a number of victims in being able
to find emergency shelter in a more private, and typically, more
supportive setting, thus avoiding some of the problems that
occured in the emergency shelters.
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